The Indiana Court of Appeals has held that Indiana’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act does not provide a conscientious exemption to paying taxes. The court reasoned that the state has a compelling interest in a uniform taxation system. The case is Tyms-Bey v. State, No. 49A05-1603-CR-439 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2017).
Indiana charged Rodney Tyms-Bey with three counts of felony tax evasion. His only response to a notice that he had falsely reported his income and tax deductions consisted of paperwork that claimed he was “a sovereign citizen” and declared himself “an estate.”
After charges were filed, Indiana adopted its version of RFRA, attracting national controversy in the process. The law tracks the federal version with several changes to its details. But the core standard remained identical: a governmental entity may not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion except where the government demonstrates the application of the burden advances a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of doing so.
On the same day that Indiana’s RFRA took effect in 2015, Tyms-Bey filed a notice that he was raising a religious defense to the criminal tax charges. The state moved to strike the defense. Tyms-Bey refused to identify his religious practice or belief that was allegedly burdened, stating only that he would present his defense to a jury and would provide all evidence at trial. The trial court struck his RFRA defense, and he appealed.
The Court of Appeals and the state agreed that RFRA does apply to criminal proceedings. Moving to the analysis of RFRA’s effect on the charges against Tyms-Bey, the Court of Appeals rejected the argument that a criminal penalty is not the least restrictive means to advance the government’s compelling interest in a uniform tax structure. Instead, the burden in question is what the defendant claims violates his religious freedom, not the penalty for violating the burdening law.
The Court of Appeals relied heavily on federal precedent, including United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), Adams v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 170 F.3d 173 (3rd Cir. 1999), and United States v. Christie, 825 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2016).
Judge Edward W. Najam, Jr. dissented from the nine-page majority opinion in a sixteen-page separate opinion. He would have reversed to allow Tyms-Bey to present evidence on his defense and objected to the majority’s declaration of a categorical exemption from RFRA’s application for taxes. In doing so, Judge Najam presented his version of the history of the federal and state RFRA, First Amendment caselaw, and caselaw interpreting the federal RFRA. These included the seminal case of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and two cases in which the Supreme Court stated that facially neutral tax laws might still fail strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause, Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), and Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
He criticized the majority’s heavy reliance on United States v. Lee. He also concluded that Tyms-Bey was being denied his right to a jury trial under Article 1 Section 19 of Indiana’s Constitution, treating RFRA as an affirmative defense to which Tyms-Bey has the burden of proof and may use to nullify the charges if the burden is met.
Tyms-Bey has thirty days to seek review by the Indiana Supreme Court. Until he declines to do so or the Supreme Court denies transfer, the decision is not final and should not be relied on as precedent.