Ind.: “Premises” Means Entire Parcel for State’s Church Liability Shield

Indiana statute protects worshipping communities from claims based on personal injuries sustained on their properties “used primarily for worship services.” The only duty owed to injured persons is to warn of hidden dangers of which it has actual knowledge and not to intentionally harm the person. So if someone gets hurt in a worship space, the religious organization very likely will have a quick exit from any lawsuit brought as a result. But what if the injury occurs elsewhere on property that also has a church building, like next to the parking lot? Is that still part of property used primarily for worship? The Indiana Supreme Court just unanimously answered “Yes.”

In Calvary Temple Church of Evansville, Inc. v. Kirsch, No. 24S-CT-378 (Ind. Feb. 11, 2025), a church leader volunteered to build a new structure next to the church parking lot to store the new church van. While working on a ladder, he fell and sustained injuries serious enough to require surgery. He sued.

When the church pointed to Indiana’s statute shielding churches from most injury claims, the injured volunteer responded that the church didn’t use the part of its land he fell on to worship, so that statutory shield didn’t apply.

The Vanderburgh Superior Court agreed and decided to allow the man’s claims to move forward. The church appealed, and the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed. It applied the statute apply only to the portions of the property used pri­marily for worship services.

But the Supreme Court disagreed. It concluded premises as used in the statute has an “expansive meaning,” which describes the entire parcel of land where the church worships. In reaching this conclusion, the Court looked to dictionary definitions of premises. It also compared the General Assembly’s choice of words in a similar section’s language, which protects religious organization’s childcare programs from liability. But that section applies only to “part of a building.” That demonstrates the legislature has singled out part of a church building in a very similar statute—and in the very next section of the Indiana Code. The Court found compelling evidence that the statute at issue applied broadly.

Finally, the Court noted that here the church uses the entire parcel for worship purposes. It warned that where a church might use parts of its parcel for purposes other than worship, the statue might not necessarily apply: “How a church uses its premises determines whether the statute applies.” But it did not provide detail about possible circumstances that might fit that description.

The statute at issue here is Ind. Code § 34-31-7-2.

Wis. Ct. App.: Church Daycare Cook Cannot Sue Based on Prohibition against Cohabitation

Wis. Ct. App.: Church Daycare Cook Cannot Sue Based on Prohibition against Cohabitation. The cook had signed a “Statement of Affirmation and Agreement” that prohibited cohabitation with “members outside of marriage.” When the church informed her that it could not permit her to continue living with her boyfriend, she quit and later sued. The court affirmed an employment commission’s decision based on, among other reasons, its determination that the cook resigned, so the church did not take an adverse employment action against her. The Christian Post reports on the decision here. Read the per curiam decision from a three-judge panel here.

W. Dist. N.C.: Religious Pro-Life Demonstrators may proceed in challenge to COVID Order on religious, not free-speech grounds

W. Dist. N.C.: Religious Pro-Life Demonstrators may proceed in challenge to COVID Order on religious, not free-speech grounds. The court granted a motion to dismiss Global Impact Ministries, Cities4Life, and Cities4Life’s president’ claims against Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, to the extent they were based on the First Amendment’s Free Speech clause. But it allowed the prochoice group to proceed in its challenge based on the Free Exercise clause, pointing to recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions and the government’s permitting secular activities during the relevant period. Religion Clause has more details here. Read the order here.

N.D. Ga.: Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine bars court from deciding “representative status” in Bishop’s suit seeking indemnification of legal fees

N.D. Ga.: Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine bars court from deciding “representative status” in Bishop’s suit seeking indemnification of legal fees. The Church Litigation Update covers the case, Kawimbe v African Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., Opinion and Order (N.D. Ga. Aug. 27, 2021), here. You can read the decision here.

W.D. N.C.: Catholic high school liable for firing teacher in same-sex marriage

W.D. N.C.: Catholic high school liable for firing teacher in same-sex marriage. The court rejected defenses based on the First Amendment—including the Ministerial Exception— Title VII, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, among others. Religion Clause reports on the decision here. Read the decision here: Billard v. Charlotte Catholic High School(W.D. N.C., Sept. 3, 2021).

“7th Circuit: Ministerial Exception Does Not Cover Hostile Work Environment Claims, Absent Tangible Employment Action7th Circuit: Ministerial Exception Does Not Cover Hostile Work Environment Claims, Absent Tangible Employment Action”

“7th Circuit: Ministerial Exception Does Not Cover Hostile Work Environment Claims, Absent Tangible Employment Action.” Religion Clause summarizes the decision here.